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                   Abstract  
Indonesian Maritime Domain has overlapping area with one of the immense project which is China’s 
New Silk Road. Thus, with providing opportunities such as financial loans and infrastructure 
investment which are essential to realize the appealing policy of Joko Widodo’s, Global Maritime 
Fulcrum. However, this project  doesn’t  seem without  implications  for Indonesian Maritime Security 
given current unsolved problems, South China Sea Dispute, IUU fishing and Natuna island. Indonesian 
Foreign Policy has always been on one of the main policy which is Free and Active. Also, internal and 
external factors such as anti-Chinese sentiment and US-China rivalry have been determinative for Joko 
Widodo’s Policy as well. The researcher used the Qualitative research method with an explanatory 
approach in conducting the research and processing the data. The primary data document directly from 
ministries as an official statement and speech of leaders. Secondary data, written and visual sources 
such as scientific books or journals, archival sources, personal documents, internet sources, other 
official documents. This research concluded that Indonesian Foreign Policy is crucial in order to obtain 
benefits while reducing implications. Therefore, this research sought to establish how Indonesian 
Foreign Policy has been managing China’s New Silk Road to maintain Maritime Security of Indonesia.   
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In recent years, with technological 
improvements, international trade and 
globalization in maritime have increased 
maritime income significantly. Therefore, 
maritime has become a significant area for 
each country to rise its welfare, especially 
for coastal or archipelagic states. As a one 
of the largest country archipelagic states in 
the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia is located at 
where major sea lanes connect East Asia, 
South Asia, and Oceania, with having 
crucial straits such as Malacca Strait, and 
plenty of natural resources. Therefore, 
Indonesian position is incredibly important 
given the change about the pivot area of 
world is to Asia-pacific and one of the 
biggest projects, BRI as well. This project 
has two main components which are 
economic belt that refers to mainland area 
announced in September 2013 and 21st 
Maritime Silk Road that describes ocean 
route announced right after one month in 
Indonesia by leader of PRC (People’s 
Republic of China), Xi Jinping. These two 
announcement are often recognized as the 
"yidai yilu" policy in Chinese or the official 
commencing of China's new Silk Road 
initiative (Ye, 2015: 217). Having impact 
on 65 countries, and with budget 
approximately $4-8 trillion, China's 
passionate  Belt and Road initiative is the 
greatest of all bi projects (Desjardins, 2018: 
2). To carry the recognition BRI one step 
further  on 28 March 2015, in Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation, 
China's National Development and Reform 
Commission also issued an action plan for 
the Belt and Road, entitled the "Vision and 
Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road 
Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road". The official document 
organized the primary goals of the "One 
Belt One Road" (OBOR) Initiative which 
turns BRI subsequently. OBOR aims to 
support the regular and free flow of the 
economy and proficient allocation of 
resources with deep integration of markets. 
Additionally, it promotes the countries to 
accomplish economic policy coordination 
and perform broader. Moreover,  regional 
cooperation of higher standards and jointly 
builds an open, comprehensive, and 
balanced regional economic cooperation 
(Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation, 2017). 
To turn Indonesia maritime country 
again and with the effect of China’s New 
Silk Road, at 9th East Asia Summit in 
November 2014 Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo declared Global Maritime fulcrum 
(GMF), which later became main of the 
Indonesia’s maritime policy between 2014-
2019 (Damuri et al., 2019). President 
Jokowi underlined  5 pillars to perform 
GMF: maritime connectivity, via  
accelerating maritime infrastructure 
development, advancement of 
transportation facilities, Maritime 
Economics; to  manage  and maintain the 
nation's maritime resources Indonesian 
maritime culture;  reconstructing 
Indonesia's national identity as a maritime 
country, maritime diplomacy; to design of 
soft power in  to handle  with regional 
threats and growing  bilateral and 
multilateral collaboration  in the maritime 
sector; maritime security, to strengthen 
Indonesia's maritime defense in order to 
secure Indonesian territory ( KAMINFO, 
2016) 
To carry out GMF fully, Indonesia has 
to solve lack of infrastructure problem in 
particular in terms of maritime connectivity 
such as ports and sea highways project and 
to improve especially less developed island 
including rural areas which also one of the 
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nine point in Nawa Cita. However, 
Indonesia’s government budget is not able 
to fund all the investment project solely by 
itself. Thus, China’s huge BRI fund such as 
Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB) is offering for loans to the 
participated countries including Indonesia 
that can be resulted in convergence 
between two projects in term of 
connectivity. The fact that to employ BRI 
completely, China certainly needs 
Indonesia in the Maritime Silk Road 
considering at Indonesia is located at one of 
key points of MSR (21st Maritime Silk 
Road) that comprise both Indian and 
Pacific Ocean. Consequently, Jakarta has 
attended both BRI and AIIB with receiving 
one of the highest loans so far. However, 
receiving high loans by China has increased 
concerns among both public and elites due 
to the “Debt Trap Policy” and historical 
untrust. Apart from that, there are existed 
maritime problems between Indonesia and 
China  that haven’t been solved yet such as  
China’s assertive attitude in South China 
Sea recently and nine-dash line claims with 
violating Natuna island’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) and IUU( illegal, 
unreported and unregulated) fishing are the 
most known.  
Regarding this, the goal of this study to 
examine the Foreign Policy of Indonesia in 
the pursuit of national interest in maritime 
domain while maintaining maritime 
security towards China’s New Silk road. 
 
 
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
 
The goal of this research is to 
analyze Indonesia's reply in the form of 
foreign policy between 2014-2019 in 
maritime security concept towards BRI 
policy with consequences such as BRI 
infrastructure investment and illegal 
fishing. This study will completely explain 
foreign policy and the maritime security 
approach, especially as regard of a country 
like Indonesia. This research is important 
for  comprehending  and considering  
policy of  Indonesia to be able to  create 
strategies in the future to face  China's BRI 
policies so that it can reduce the 
implications  to Indonesia's maritime 
security  As a result of that, this research 
examines foreign policy of  Indonesia in 
dealing with BRI . 
This research is anticipated to maintain 
novelty and offer strategic options 
connected to Indonesia's foreign policy to 
diminish Indonesia's maritime security 
problems such as inequality of maritime 
sector problem in the future as much as 
possible. It is hoped that the research 
findings can be connected support 
Indonesian foreign policy instruments 
arrangements that effectively respond to the 
China’s New Silk Road. 
 
 
2. Literature Review   
 
2.1 Foreign Policy 
 
Since, globalization and the current 
progress of the international nature of 
foreign policy problems, a state has been 
affected by various features to have 
complete authority on the consequences of 
its decision due to the geographical or 
global circumstances. This situation leads 
the country to regulate its foreign policy to 
fit with the growing multilateral nature in 
the entire area and demonstrate national 
interests in a higher intensity than before. 
At present, vital issue directly related to the 
national interest that were previously low 
profile or not considered as obligatory are 
now having more attention. For instance, as 
regards the state's obligation to protect its 
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citizens' prosperity, also other issues related 
to democracy and human rights (Widjojo, 
2005: 6). 
It is obvious that all country's 
foreign policy is affected by two main 
determining factors, namely external 
(international) and domestic (internal) 
factors. These two factors are seen which 
assist in shaping and forming a country's 
foreign policy. As regards the relationship 
between external and internal factors, 
international relations and foreign policy 
analysis researchers have long discussion 
whether the two are mutually exclusive or 
independent or, both are interdependent 
and overlapping affair.  As a structure of 
intercourse at the international level, 
foreign policy is about the interaction of 
one country with other countries; the study 
of foreign policy cannot disregard 
international factors in its discussion. Thus, 
the factors of international relations such as 
international systems and structures of 
global domination, international law, 
international organizations, alliances, 
strength, and military competitions 
between nations in the region cannot be 
negligible. (Bojang, 2018). 
Moreover, a country's internal 
habitat impacts on the nature and direction 
of its foreign policy in diverse road. The 
internal environment relates to the country's 
size, socio-economic and cultural 
improvement throughout history, and the 
political regime that affects the country. 
However, differences in political 
institutionalization and social structures, 
differences in military capabilities, and 
differences in strategic cultural directions 
also define foreign policy's character. In 
addition, differences in public points of 
view, understanding of the state's role, rules 
of decision regulation, and the personality 
and tendency of a country's political leaders 
also diversify the nature and destination of 
foreign policy from one country to another. 
Therefore, it is  finalized that the material 
of a country's foreign policy always arise 
from domestic and foreign political issues 
(Union of International Associations, 
2020). 
 
2.2. Maritime Security 
 
By scholars of International 
Relations and Security, “Maritime 
Security" is often considered as a concept 
that is too wide. Thus, over last few 
decades, the concept of maritime security 
has become a great topic of discussion 
including many researchers to search and 
improve it. Yet, there are a number main 
units in maritime security deriving from the 
international, public, and private sectors 
whose primary targets are;  (Feldt et al., 
2013: 2): 
• maintain the freedom of the sea, 
• facilitate and sustain trade, and 
• maintain good governance at sea. 
Recently, the maritime security approach 
has been gradually more discussed the fact 
that the strategic role of a country's waters 
is highly increased, in particular regarding 
the mobility function and economic 
benefits of every country in the world. 
The extent of maritime security 
issues is vast and varied increasingly 
influential to one an another, ranging from  
to freedom of navigation, safety at sea; 
natural disaster phenomena at sea; 
transnational organized crimes at sea, to 
issues showing relevant  to the environment 
at sea (Cozens, 2010: 157). Non-traditional 
maritime security threats such as maritime 
terrorism; Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (IUU) fishing; radicalism; 
piracy; arms smuggling; human smuggling 
and trafficking; and environmental 
pollution in the sea, are no longer the 
control solely of the navy in many countries 
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yet the responsibility and the domain of the 
coast guard's mission and marine policies 
(Burroughs & Mazurek, 2019: 9) 
Besides of non-traditional security threats, 
maritime security is also originated in the 
concept of marine safety. The concept of 
marine safety describes as an attempt to 
supply ships and marine installations' 
safety to protect marine professionals and 
the marine environment which rose the 
value of seaports. Moreover, maritime 
security is also certainly related to 
economic development issues. The sea is an 
essential part as a shipping route, trade 
route, and the fulfilment of natural 
resources such as fossil fuels and mining 
materials from the seabed. Some of the 
components of maritime security are;  
sovereignty-territorial integrity and 
political independence, International and 
national peace and security, security of Sea 
Lines of Communications, security 
protection from crimes at sea, resource 
security, access to resources at sea and to 
the seabed, environmental protection, 
security of all seafarers and fishermen 
(Feldt et al., 2013: 3) 
Maritime security positively 
requires state capability in defining policy 
facet, whether to cooperate or not; which 
country will perform mutual operations 
with; how to regulate fixed general 
maritime rules that unite military and 
civilian; and how to set maritime defence 
and security policies (United States 
Government, 2010: 18). Nevertheless, 
UNCLOS is confirmed by 167 countries 
that has decided an agreement among all 
stakeholders that national territorial waters 
are 12 nautical miles (nm) from shore to 
sea, with some countries demand 24 nm. 
United Nation Convention Law of Sea 
(UNCLOS) explains this as a "contiguous 
zone" of limited rights and responsibilities. 
There is also a more important territory in 
maritime security which the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ is up to 
200 nm away, where some countries are in 
effort to broaden this zone for economic 
targets relating to the continental shelf up to 
350 nm. These different assertions 
constantly damage maritime security 
elements resulting disputes and dynamics 
in global maritime security. 
 
 
3. Methods  
  
This research will be applied an 
explanatory qualitative research methods. 
A qualitative approach is applied because it 
can express particular causal relationships 
and explanations in interactions between 
countries. To brief, a qualitative method 
was selected to support reliability  as 
defined by Cresswell, i.e., it permits 
researchers to debate social phenomena 
holistically, strengthen continuous 
introspection, and support the use of 
complicated reasoning that is multifaceted, 
repeated, and synchronous research 
strategies ( Creswell, 2013: 213). This 
study will use two type of data sources, 
firstly primary sources and secondary 
sources. The first source will acquire from 
official documents by relevant ministries, 
institutions and speech, statements by 
leader and officials. Secondary sources 
obtained from written and visual sources 
such as scientific books or journals, 
archival sources, personal documents, 
internet sources, other official documents, 
as well as news in electronic media such as 
television news etc. 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
4.1 The Features of Indonesian Foreign 
Policy and Indonesia-China Relations 
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From independency to present, 
Indonesian foreign policy has been 
undergoing several and significant periods 
and has been affected by various factors 
such as international environment, Internal-
external aspects with diverse approach of 
leaders towards China. 
One of the main principles that 
affects and design Indonesian Foreign 
Policy is ''free and active" since 
independence (Defence Ministry of The 
Republic of Indonesia, 2015). Free" refers 
that Indonesia does not take sides with 
major powers that are discordant with the 
nation's character and identity. At the same 
time, "active" means that Indonesia is not 
passive in to implement foreign policy and 
answering to international situations that 
comprise it. 
To begin with, after  the end of 
''New Order'' period , in the context of  
Indonesia-China relations, a new period has 
begun showing  good relations between the 
two since late 1999, in which both attained 
momentum after the inauguration of 
President Abdurrahman Wahid where 
Indonesia  demonstrated an expression to 
construct a higher relationship with China 
after a long time .(Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in the Republic of 
Indonesia, 2004). This moment emphasized   
to strengthen economic relations between 
the two countries. This situation continued 
similar with Megawati, but in 2005, during 
the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
administration, China became Indonesia's 
fifth-largest trading partner, which resulted 
in the signing of a strategic partnership 
agreement between the two countries aimed 
at cooperation not only in the fields of 
investment and trade but also  technology 
(Sukma, 2009: 93). 
Under Jokowi administration, for 
the first time China has surpassed Japan as 
trade partner of Indonesia. Indonesia-China 
relations have become more active in 
several area, and intense in particular in the 
economic field where investment and aid in 
China's Belt Road Initiatives (BRI) 
Program for infrastructure projects is 
welcomed by the Indonesian government. 
In numerous meeting, Indonesia 
emphasized its interest in maritime 
connectivity. In the Indonesia–China High-
Level Meeting on People-to-People 
Exchange Mechanisms, China remarked 
that Indonesia is the leading country in 
Southeast Asia to enhance for bilateral 
collaboration in negotiating economic, 
political, and person-to-person perspectives 
security exchanges (Utami, 2016).  
Moreover, on 22 September 2015 at 
the Centre for Education and Training 
(CET) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Republic of Indonesia, the Chinese 
Ambassador to Indonesia Xie Feng, in his 
statement underlined that Indonesia-China 
cooperation through the China MSR 
Program could significantly strengthen 
Indonesia's GMF. This plan can be done 
through several main agendas, such as 
providing financial assistance, 
technological developments, and 
increasing the volume of China's 
production (Xie Feng: Hand in Hand for 
Common Development, 2015).However, 
internal(domestic) and external factors 
have always been affective to design 
foreign policy in particular such a 
diversified community with being one of 
the highest-populated country that are 
namely: 
 
a. Internal factor  
 
Throughout history of the Indonesia-
China relation, major   domestic factors are 
historical untrust, anti-Chinese sentiments, 
elites’ perspectives who are skeptical 
towards China, in particular in Pribumi elite 
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group who shows   adverse stand to 
President Joko Widodo government. For 
example, particular head of Islamic 
organizations, former high-ranking official, 
public intellectuals, scholars. Some argued 
that the intention of BRI infrastructure 
development in Indonesia is managing 
strategic area. For example, China’s wish   
to finance the Sunda Strait bridge where 
there is a linkage with Sumatra between 
Java was seen as a signal of such gain. 
Since,  it is the second shortest way from 
the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean after 
the Malacca Strait   (Herlijanto, 2017: 
4).Also, In the first period of Joko Widodo, 
pro-people  diplomacy and inward looking 
approach is more dominant due to the fact 
that  lack of economic capabilities and 
infrastructure  were one of the domestic 
factor causing welcoming approach  to 
China’s BRI. Moreover, with the increase 
of influx of Chinese labor after a plenty of 
Chinese Direct Investment in Indonesia and 
the fear of economic domination by China 
are new obstacles for Joko Widodo 
welcoming policies. 
 
b. External Factor  
 
  As it mentioned above, Asia-Pacific 
is an  attractive area worldwide as a result 
US has been trying to be influential actor 
for regional countries to stabilize the region 
via reducing China’s rising affect in the 
pursuit of US national interest and also with 
maritime patrol US making  contribution 
for maintain good governance and  at 
facilitate trade. Indonesia-US relations is 
not recent for instance in "New Order", 
Indonesia had interaction with US 
especially in terms of having financial 
loans.  The cooperation with US will hinder 
Indonesia being too dependent on just one 
power. Nevertheless, withdrawal of Trump 
from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
caused more space to China’s influence in 
the region especially under massive project, 
BRI.  
Due to the high-number of economic 
agreements between Indonesia-China put 
China in an economic partner meanwhile 
given IUU fishing and Natuna Island EEZ 
violation which most of time by China. 
These problems are the obstacles to 
proceed relations between two countries. 
In 2015, minimum three illegal 
fishing vessels from China in Natuna 
waters were sunk by the Minister of 
Maritime Affairs which referred to “shock 
therapy”, and Ministry Susi Pudjiastuti 
stressed that Indonesia is   taking action 
against crimes  by other countries in its 
waters, and  stealing fish is a crime ( BBC, 
2016) She marked that the goal is  to get rid 
of  crimes in Indonesian waters. Following 
the protests by China, Susi told that 
Indonesia's action against fish thieves, not  
the state in particular. 
Moreover, in fishing town of Tanmen in 
Hainan, Xi Jinping suggested fishermen to 
"not only lead fishing activities but also 
collect marine information and support the 
development of islands and coral reefs" in 
the Natuna waters certainly causing threats 
for Indonesian Maritime Domain. Not 
surprisingly in October 2013, Chinese 
fishermen is supplied financial and political 
assistance for fishing activities in the 
controversial waters to support China's 
nine-dash line claim. As a reaction, besides 
to the sinking of the ship and the legal 
process, Indonesia also abandon the some 
bilateral fisheries cooperation agreed  by 
the two countries at that year(Zhao, 2015). 
 Minister Susi’s solid attack was a kind of 
confuted by Joko Widodo on April 13, 
2016, when Song Tao, head of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s international 
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department, met President Joko Widodo in 
the midst of Natuna incidents. In the end of 
meeting, Pramono Anung, Cabinet 
Secretary, said   that “the matter is 
considered resolved and is also considered 
a misunderstanding, and in the future, 
China and Indonesia will respect each 
other’s territorial waters”   
Also, this statement is unclear and was not 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but 
instead the Cabinet Secretary. It was also 
announced that “Jakarta and Beijing 
expressed a strong desire to improve 
relations at all levels (Suryadinata, 2016: 
8). There is a concern whether too much 
economic dependency on China can affect 
Jakarta’s approach such as being too soft 
against China’s violation or not. 
In 2016, exceedingly 90% of raw oil 
volume transferring along the South China 
Sea on route the Strait of Malacca, leading 
to be one of the  world’s main oil transit 
chokepoints due to the most brief sea route 
between supplier in markets in Asia, 
Persian Gulf and Africa. In addition, a 
considerable amount of raw oil (about 1.4 
million b/d) stream through the strait to 
Singapore and the west coast of Peninsular 
Malaysia, where it is convert before passing 
the South China Sea in the form of 
petroleum products(U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), 2018.) 
Maritime traffic in the South China Sea is a 
continuation of the ALKI (Indonesian 
Archipelago Sea Lane), which crosses the 
Malacca Strait. Thus, because it is in 
contact with ALKI, which is under the 
sovereignty Indonesia, indirectly maritime 
traffic around the South China Sea is also 
part of the implementation of the GMF. 
(Fitriyanti, 2019: 80). 
 
4.2 Indonesian National Interest and 
Policy in Maritime Domain between 
2014-2019 
 
In order to become a maritime 
power again and realize the Jalesveva 
Jayamahe (in the ocean we triumph) 
motto, GMF suites for Jokowi's  first 
period to build up Indonesia as a 
maritime country. The GMF also aimed 
to reconstruct the country’s maritime 
culture and widen the maritime 
economy, presenting a national policy 
and development agenda via five pillars 
which extended to 7 pillar that involve 
maritime security and maritime 
economy. Joko Widodo, in his 
inauguration speech, said that: 
 
"We have to work as hard as 
possible to turn Indonesia into a 
maritime nation once again. 
Oceans, seas, straits, and bays are 
the future of our civilization. We 
have turned our back on the seas, 
oceans, straits, and bays for far too 
long. It is time for us to realize 
"Jalesveva Jayamahe," "in the 
ocean we triumph," a motto upheld 
by our ancestors in the past. We 
want to make that happen again." 
(Widodo, Inauguration Speech, 
2014). 
 
The fragile and ambiguous structure of 
maritime has brought maritime security in 
a new concept especially with the increase 
of globalization that boosted trade and 
shipping activities in maritime domain 
including non-traditional threats. 
Therefore, maintain the freedom of the sea, 
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facilitate and sustain trade, and maintain 
good governance at sea has become crucial 
pillar of maritime security (Feldt et al., 
2013: 2).In order to employ these pillars, 
maritime connectivity has become 
prominent which needs improved 
infrastructure. 
Consequently, President Joko 
Widodo has constantly emphasized  that in  
under his governance infrastructure 
investment is one of priority given lack of 
infrastructure investment in Indonesia , 
additionally connectivity is one of the pillar 
in GMF to carry out other pillars such 
maritime security and maritime economy 
for instance  the number of high quality of 
port in Singapore  is higher than Indonesia 
which  resulting in international trade 
ships’ preferences  to Singapore. 
Furthermore, the less of connectivity 
between islands decreased development in 
east islands as well. In this case , BRI meets  
for Indonesia’s needs which  aims to 
receiving financial loans  especially for 
infrastructure subsequently connectivity. 
Also, Indonesia has other funding options 
for investment such as US and Japan. 
In order to  develop the capacity  in 
international market and internal 
connectivity to be able to achieve the less 
developed  improvement, Sea Toll Policy 
has become one of the important  element  
of GMF. In addition,  to enhance  the people 
productivity and competitiveness in 
international market, and with the growth 
of internal connectivity to maintain  even 
distribution of development. Also, all 
infrastructure investment is predicted to 
reduce logistic costs. Sea Highway 
program will also include 160 non-
commercial ports as a sub-feeder of Sea 
Highway, building 50 pioneer shipping and 
193 pioneer shipping routes (Sriyanto, 
2018: 5) 
Thus, to carry out  one of the main 
pillars , infrastructure investment, 
numerous topics are planned in the 
National Medium-Term Development Plan 
(2015–2019). In the maritime infrastructure 
development sector, to construct 24 new 
seaports and 60 new ferry ports including 
ferry ports and capacity building for more 
than one hundred and fifty inter-island 
ports issued by  the Indonesian government 
has set an ambitious target .Indonesia also 
needs ferry ports and capacity building for 
more than one hundred and fifty inter-
island ports  (BPKP, 2021).  
Therefore, on March 1,Presidential 
Regulation (Peraturan Presiden) No. 16 of 
2017 on Indonesian Sea Policy in launched  
to escalate realize  GMF policy, "In the 
accompany of  this regulation, Marine and 
human resource development; 
Environmental protection, and ocean space 
management was added to GMF with 76 
programs containing several ministries and 
institutions. The  seventy-six programs 
were afterwards divided  into 425 activities 
to accomplish 330 goals extending  7 which 
are’ (Laksmana, 2017: 2).  
The GMF’s original pillars were expanded 
into: 
 Marine and human resource 
development; 
 Naval defence, maritime 
security, and safety at sea; 
 Ocean governance 
institutionalization; 
 Maritime economy, 
infrastructure, and welfare; 
 Environmental protection and 
ocean space management; 
 Nautical culture; and 
 Maritime diplomacy. 
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However, overlapping key roles and 
functions between ministries, maritime 
management sectors, and agencies caused   
lack of coordination between areas and 
growing sectoral egos are a major 
administrative challenge. 
 
4.3 Chinese Investments under Joko 
Widodo Administration   
 
With the end of New Order, 
Chinese Foreign Investment (CFI) has 
begun in Indonesia followed by rising in 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono period, and 
accelerated in Joko Widodo first period. 
After the announcement BRI in 2013 
Beijing has been calling all FDI project as 
a BRI project to collect under the same 
plan. Chinese Foreign investment in 
Indonesia mainly can be shaped which are 
Industrial Park, Power Plant, construction, 
infrastructure Investments, and e-
commerce. Power, mining, manufacturing 
etc. are carried out commonly via Industrial 
Park. Industrial Park has  essential  status  
in FDI investment, which is defined as an 
zone run and marketed by a private or 
public company providing required 
infrastructures such as electricity, water, 
and a sewerage system by itself which 
provides advantaged for under-developed 
island and rural area  that is desired in  
Nawa Cita and GMF. Furthermore, it 
supplies a series of sustaining services 
(permits, security) and property facilities. 
Industrial Estates in Indonesia generally 
offer infrastructure, special facilities, and 
services  
China’s industrial park investments is 
expanding along the BRI route, therefore 
the biggest portion is received by Southeast 
Asia countries.  In 2015, the total stock of 
Chinese direct investment in Southeast 
Asia hit 62.82 billion US dollars which 
equals 54.3% of BRI investment. In 2016, 
20 overseas cooperation zones were 
approved by the Ministry of Commerce, of 
which seven were located in Southeast 
Asian countries along the BRI i.e., 
Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and 
Indonesia. Chinese investment in Southeast 
Asia is mainly focus on Indonesia, 
Cambodia, and Thailand, with broad 
cooperation in mining, engineering 
machinery, cultivation , and building   
(Song et al., 2018:1294). 
Industrial Park hasn’t been appeared 
with BRI. Nevertheless, it is seen as a part 
of BRI in particular by China. it is clear that 
the places are rich of raw and natural 
resources for instance Morowali Industrial 
Park in central Sulawasi where nickel is 
highest resources. Beside best minerals, the 
expenses of logistic is diminished due to the 
being near to resources. As a result of that 
China is having countless benefits via using 
Indonesia’s lack of investment situation 
and prosperous natural resources. Indonesia 
is one if the wealthiest nation in natural 
resources such as having the most natural 
gas reserves and gold in Asia Pacific. Also,  
Indonesia has abundantly palm oil, and 
cocoa because of having tropical seasons 
(Juwita et al., 2020: 211). 
On the report of  World Bank data,  The 
nation's GDP increases from $890.815 
billion in 2014 to $1.119 Trillion  in 
2019(Indonesia | Data, 2019). At that 
situation FDI contribution can be 
considered logical, and China’s share is 
rising each year. 
 On the other hand, Luky Eko 
Wuryanto, Vice President Chief 
Administration Officer of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
explained that at present Indonesia's depth  
to AIIB is  US$950 million and is 
84 
Global Political Studies Journal   
Volume 5 Nomor 2 Edisi Oktober 2021  







anticipated to rise as  the infrastructure 
investment boosts(Kinanti, 2019). 
Also, one of the efforts of Indonesian 
Foreign Policy is to secure and stabilize the 
region with joint trust amid countries and 
dynamic equilibrium that doesn’t wish one 
sides heaviness in the area in terms of US-
China rivalry. Although by two leaders 
emphasized convergence of MSR and 
GMF, since it overlaps with Indonesian 
waters and assertive attitude of China 
regarding South China Sea can be resulted 
in security issues for Indonesia in the 
future. Additionally, China’s high 
influence on Asia Pacific region can 
deteriorate to freedom of navigation via 
possessing assets, such as happened in Sri 
Lanka’s port due to the high dept and 
growing maritime traffic owing to  the high 
possible BRI capacity in the following year. 
 As it mentioned before Jokowi’s policy has 
mostly concentrate  on infrastructure and 
attracting  infrastructure investment to 
reduce poverty,  inequality assist  
development (Warburton, 2016).  
To sum up, Indonesian Foreign 
policy between 2014-2019 draws 
welcoming tendency towards BRI. 
Nevertheless, Joko Widodo is also aware of   
negative impact of BRI, and trying to 
minimize as much as possible via putting 
some conditions in bilateral agreements and   
 following middle power policy to stabilize 
the region. 
 
4.4 Benefits and implications of 
Indonesian Foreign Policy towards 
China’s New Silk Road in Maritime 
Security between 2014-2019 
 
Between 2014-2019, the Joko 
Widodo’s main policy was to return   
Indonesia maritime power in the region and   
globally as well with growing   maritime 
economic development to enhance 
prosperity of people as it mentioned 2014 
election campaign. Therefore, Global 
Maritime Fulcrum was planned just one 
year later of China’s New Silk Road, 
additionally "middle power" policy in Asia 
Pacific to support security in the region and 
maintain stability among big powers.  
 In the first period Indonesia and China 
relations has been improved significantly. 
It has been called “honeymoon” of relations  
which demonstrated  welcoming approach 
by Indonesian side((Mustapa  et al., 2019: 
8 ).Nevertheless, in decision making-
process domestic and external factors have 
the main roles in such a varied population, 
and having exceedingly close relationship 
with China has rose concern among public 
which criticize Joko Widodo’s policy  
especially productive age population while 
waiting to be employed. This situation has 
been forging anti-Chinese sentiment after 
high influx of Chinese labour even though 
for non-skilled that has been claimed in 
Morowali industrial park. Also, there are 
some concerns for construction investment 
in the strategic area can cause increase 
China’s expansion in Malacca Strait. 
Likewise, In BRI, there are already project 
to bypass Malacca Strait in both via 
economic belt and maritime road such as 
Gwadar, Pakistan. It shows that that China 
has been in effort to build up its supremacy 
in maritime that having control Sea Line of 
communication which damage Indonesian 
Maritime Security. Conversely, from pro-
Joko Widodo point of view, it is beneficial 
to have China’s assist to develop maritime 
connectivity so that trade can be facilitated, 
sustain and good governance can be 
improved as well. However, the fear of 
China’s economic domination in Indonesia 
has increased both in elites and public that 
can cause a hindrance in Joko Widodo’s 
positive policy.    
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To stress the accomplishment  in first 
period of presidency , In the infrastructure 
week 2019, Joko Widodo emphasized that 
in his first period  it has constructed 947km 
of toll roads, 3,432km of highways, 39km 
of bridges, 10 new airports, 19 ports, and 17 
dams etc.( President of Republic of 
Indonesia, 2019).  
In addition, to preserve good 
governance at Indonesian waters as much 
as possible, monitoring a non-traditional 
crime is crucial. Nevertheless, Indonesia-
China relations at this point haven't been 
successful in terms of cooperation, Since,  
“maritime” is primary initiative and vision, 
namely the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 
Initiative of President Xi and the Global 
Maritime Fulcrum of President by Jokowi, 
it is  anticipated that Indonesia and China 
would improve their maritime cooperation 
more However, in the number of 
international treaties agreed in the maritime 
sector, the two international treaties signed 
on the maritime sector, and only one MoU 
(Memorandum of Understanding )was 
signed during Jokowi’s first period 
presidency, namely that of the Maritime 
Search and Rescue Cooperation that 
mention maritime security(Lalisang & 
Candra, 2020: 11) 
On the other hand, UUI fishing has 
been carrying on time to times by China. In 
one of the recent UUI incident between two 
country, even though China underlined that 
they accept Indonesian Sovereign over 
Natuna, it hasn’t changed the fact that 
China’s nine-dash line claim is violating 
Indonesian EEZ which is sovereignty of 
territorial water. Apart from that, China’s 
assertive policy in South China Sea, and 
ASEAN’s lack of conciliation in 2012 to 
joint declaration about South China Sea 
dispute showed China’s impact on some 
countries in ASEAN such as Cambodia’s 
decision(Anwar,2019:154).While realizing 
welcoming policies by government for 
foreign investment such as power plants 
and industrial park constructions which can 
be essential for improving less developed 
island’s infrastructure, it must be noted that 
maritime traffic of Chinese ship will 
become  get bigger and bigger with the high 
mobility of China.  
 




Indonesian Foreign policy towards 
China between 2014-2019 is welcoming 
due to the huge volume of BRI 
infrastructure investment to accelerate both 
in connectivity between the islands and 
within the island to obtain targets of Joko 
Widodo governance preferential policy 
which is GMF.  In 2014, policy of Joko 
Widodo was seen more inward looking to 
develop economy through foreign 
investments. As a result, foreign 
investments have become vital in this term. 
Indonesia officially attended BRI and 
AIIB, consequently, the volume of CFI has 
risen dramatically.  
However, it has climbed concerns 
related to probable implication for 
Indonesian Maritime security such as 
China’s economic domination and 
exploitation of natural resources. 
Furthermore, because of the vague 
economic result of BRI in long term and 
depth trap diplomacy which can cause 
China receiving possessions of strategic 
locations that can threaten maritime 
security of Indonesia. On the other hand, 
pro-Jokowi side's point is that collaboration 
with BRI can be helpful in terms of trade 
can be sustain and facilitated in maritime 
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domain due the fact that increased 
connectivity. Moreover, BRI investment is 
already had large capacity and presumably 
to rise more in the following years. 
Although Indonesia has alternative investor 
such Singapore, Japan and US, China’s 
share has become progressively more. To 
some scholar, Indonesian economic 
dependency on China can cut the capability 
of Indonesia’s answer to maritime security 
incidents such as China’s assertive 
approach to South China Sea and Natuna 
EEZ. 
It is clear that BRI is an expansion 
project of China in particular via CFI, and 
Indonesia is sharing overlapping maritime 
domain with MSR. Also, one of the other 
attractive policy Joko Widodo’s in Asia 
Pacific is “dynamic equilibrium” to 
stabilize regions security due to the 
increased US-Sino rivalry so that heaviness 
of both sides in the region can be used 
useful in regard of Indonesian national 
interest.  
 In the end, Indonesian Foreign policy 
towards BRI can be considered welcoming 
and initiative despite of opposition to Joko 
Widodo. Indeed, Jakarta is also conscious 
of negative effect. Thus, this policy can be 
named welcoming in attention. 
 
 
5.2 Recommendation   
 
Based on the data collected and analysis of 
the research, the researcher makes the 
following recommendations;  
In spite of  the fact that Indonesia has 
already varied foreign investors and 
financial loans, China’s share is still 
increasingly high. Jakarta should decrease 
the depth level or rearrange the finance 
contracts. Jakarta is able to achieve that due 
to the  Indonesia’s highly powerful 
strategic location  for bargain, For example, 
Malaysia renewed the some BRI projects 
because of high depth level recently 
referring depth trap diplomacy. In addition, 
even infrastructure investment such as 
industrial park, power plants contributes 
the infrastructure development of islands 
besides Java as it is desired, it shouldn’t be 
forgotten mostly industrial park are 
constructed the place where natural 
resources are very rich. Jakarta should be 
aware of the long-term exploitation by 
China. Also, China's effort to create new 
routes to shortcut Malacca Strait should be 
considered carefully in case in long term it 
can be achieved. Also, high Chinese labour 
influx should be reduced in particular for 
non-skilled ones to hire Indonesian 
workers. Last but not least, with China's 
New Silk Project, Beijing's maritime traffic 
will reach higher number that gives more 
space to apply nine-dash claim, at this point 
being too dependent on economically can 
cause limitation Indonesian's response 
ability in long term.  
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